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Why You Should Build a Consumer GenAI Startup and How to Make it Happen

While conventional wisdom holds that B2B startups are the safer choice, is this really the case? Let’s delve into why a consumer-focused GenAI startup might actually be your golden ticket.

In 2023, the startup landscape of GenAI applications experienced a remarkable surge, propelled by the advent of ChatGPT and foundational models such as GPT-4 and Anthropic. Over the past year, venture capital has invested at least $21 billion into GenAI, and most GenAI applications have primarily targeted on B2B, particularly productivity improvement. In the latest Y Combinator batch, 65% of the startups fall within the B2B SaaS and enterprise sectors, whereas only 11% are focused on consumer-oriented verticals. The most popular product form is AI assistant.

Current Challenges in B2B GenAI

However, as we transition into 2024, it has become evident that a lot of startups in the domain are facing significant challenges. A majority of these B2B GenAI companies are grappling with financial losses and are frequently pivoting in an attempt to find product market fit.

Many startup founders struggle to convert Proof-of-Concept contracts into full annual agreements, often facing significant limitations in their bargaining power over pricing. Despite the $21 billion VC investment, GenAI startup only generated around $1 billion in revenue.

Heavy competition is one of the main challenges for startups in converting Proof-of-Concept contracts. But why is there such a strong focus on productivity improvement applications? The reasons are multifaceted and stem from various technology and market dynamics:

First, it is related to the nature of the current foundational models. Foundation models such as GPT-4 are the result of significant research breakthroughs and depend extensively on benchmarks that have been established within the academic community. Historically, these benchmarks have predominantly focused on knowledge-based tasks. For example, the benchmarks used in the GPT-4 technical report primarily consist of academic tests. Essentially, what we are creating with these models are entities akin to exceptionally skilled students or professors. This orientation naturally steers generative AI applications toward productivity enhancements. Consequently, it’s not surprising that students are the primary users of many AI-assisted products like copilots.

Second, there is a B2B-first culture in the American startup ecosystem. The American startup ecosystem has predominantly favored B2B ventures, with the consumer sector receiving significantly less investment over the past decade. Startup founders in US are afraid to build consumer startups. Although other countries such as China do not exhibit this fixed mindset, the U.S. has been a global leader in generative AI research and substantially influencing trends worldwide.

Third, the GenAI infrastructure boom levels the playing field for everyone. In 2023, the majority of investments were directed towards GenAI infrastructure, with many investment firms likening it to a “gold rush.” There’s a prevailing belief that, much like the merchants who sold supplies during a gold rush, those who provide the essential tools and services will profit first. The following figure shows that $16.9B out of the $21B billion VC money was spent on GenAI infrastructure. Newer players can always leverage better infrastructure.

Source: Sequoia Capital’s AI Ascent 2024 opening remarks

Due to the factors mentioned above, competition among productivity-focused GenAI applications is intense, undermining the ability of startups in this space to extract value from customers. As a result, the entire ecosystem remains predominantly financed by venture capital.

The Untapped Potential of Consumer GenAI

History often repeats itself. During the Internet boom of the 1990s, emphasis was initially placed on B2B applications. However, it turned out that the integration of the Internet into business contexts would take longer than anticipated. Salesforce pioneered the SaaS model, but it took nearly a decade to reach the $1 billion revenue milestone. In contrast, consumer applications have proven to be a quicker avenue for both creating and capturing value.

Google, Facebook, and Amazon have each developed consumer products that serve billions of people, discovering unique methods to monetize the internet by reaching vast audiences cost-effectively. Additionally, this approach has proven to be an effective strategy for building strong competitive advantages, or moats.

Strategies for Success

The 7-power framework is a crucial tool for analyzing business opportunities, identifying seven key levers: Scale Economies, Network Economies, Counter-Positioning, Switching Costs, Branding, Cornered Resource, and Process Power. For B2B GenAI startups,

Counter-Positioning and Process Power are typically the only levers B2B GenAI startups can pull due to incumbents holding advantages in the other areas. In contrast, Consumer GenAI startups have the potential to develop competitive moats across almost all these powers, providing numerous strategic advantages — especially if your founding team has strong technical capability in AI models and infrastructure.

It’s crucial for Consumer GenAI companies to own their AI models and infrastructure. This ownership not only fosters the development of Scale and Network Economies but also secures Cornered Resources, enhancing competitive advantage and market positioning.

On the one hand, to create a successful consumer app, controlling costs is crucial. Historical trends in developing larger and more powerful models have made them unsuitable for consumer applications due to high costs as the lifetime value (LTV) of consumer use-cases is typically much lower. For example, the LTV of a user is often just $20-30 but might ask hundreds of questions. However, utilizing all the tokens in GPT-4 can cost approximately $1.28 for a single call. Developing in-house expertise to create models that are both powerful and cost-effective is crucial to bridge the gap.

The good thing is that consumer applications are usually much more tolerant to hallucination, and might not need the most powerful model. In addition, the evolution of open-source models has enabled startups to develop their own models cost-effectively. With the recent launch of LLaMa 3, its 8B small model has outperformed the largest model from LLaMa 2. Additionally, there is anticipation that the 400B model, currently in training, will match the performance of GPT-4. These advancements make it feasible for startups to create high-performing models at a fraction of the cost associated with proprietary models. While significant investment is still necessary to reduce costs sufficiently to support large-scale consumer applications.

On the other hand, current foundational models are not ideally suited for creating robust consumer applications, as most large language models lack personalization and long-term memory capabilities. Developing new foundational models or adapting existing ones to better suit consumer needs is a critical challenge that Consumer GenAI startups must address.

Despite these challenges, startups that successfully tackle these issues can secure a significant competitive edge and establish long-lasting market dominance.

Thanks for reading this article and hope the article is useful for you. If you have any questions or thoughts, please don’t hesitate to comment or message me at jing@jingconan.com 🤗

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How 500 Lines of Code Challenged a $500M AI Giant, and What Moats GenAI Startups Should Have

Recently, there’s been an interesting development in the big model industry. Perplexity AI, a hot big model company in Silicon Valley, completed a financing round two months ago, valuing it at over $500 million. However, using Lepton AI’s middleware, Lepton’s co-founder Jiayang Qing managed to create an open-source version with just 500 lines of code over a weekend, sparking a heated discussion in the industry. The related demo on GitHub quickly garnered five thousand stars in just a few days. This incident reflects a broader trend, and I’ll analyze it based on my own year and a half of entrepreneurial experience.

Currently, big model companies can be categorized into three types:

  • Base model companies, which primarily provide big model capabilities. This area requires significant capital and resources are highly concentrated among leading companies and giants.
  • Middleware companies, which offer middleware between big models and applications. Jiayang Qing’s Lepton AI falls into this category.
  • Application-layer companies, which directly provide consumer-facing applications. These can further be divided into platform-type application companies, like Perplexity AI, and vertical application companies focusing on niche markets, such as Harvey AI, which recently completed financing for its legal application.

The incident with Perplexity AI and Lepton AI highlights a pain point for application-layer companies — high competitive pressure with insufficient moats. For instance, Perplexity, which aims to solve general information search problems, faces challenges from four fronts: pressure from giants like Google, competition from vertical knowledge applications like Harvey, market encroachment from other knowledge service companies, and disruptions from middleware companies like Lepton AI. Vertical application companies face slightly less pressure, but they still confront these four forces and have a smaller market size, resulting in fewer resources.

So, what can be done? Many entrepreneurs believe that accumulating proprietary data can create a sufficient moat. This is very sensible, but it presupposes a systematic methodology for acquiring proprietary data. Here, I propose a methodology: using contrarian insights to gain a time advantage, leveraging the founder’s personal strengths for breakthroughs, and focusing on data-first products or operational capabilities.

First, contrarian insights, or insights not commonly understood, are essential. Entrepreneurs must find less trodden paths to build their core competitive advantage with minimal resources. What was once a contrarian insight can become common knowledge, such as the combination of big models with chat interfaces, which was novel before ChatGPT but is now common.

Second, the founder’s personal advantage is crucial. While contrarian insights offer temporary protection, they quickly become common knowledge once proven useful. Here, a deep understanding of user pain points in vertical applications can be a personal advantage. For example, one of Harvey’s co-founders was a lawyer. Even if a team doesn’t have a co-founder from a specific industry, previous experiences that can be leveraged as industry advantages are valuable.

Finally, building a data-first product or operational capability is key. The founder’s personal advantage must be systematized to sustain. There are two strategies:

  • Product-driven: The founder uses their deep understanding of user needs to design a product that naturally accumulates high-quality data, enhancing the product experience and creating a flywheel effect.
  • Operation-driven: The founder uses their resources and experience to build an operational system that continually acquires proprietary data, making operations or sales more efficient and faster.

The former suits products focused on Product-led Growth (PLG), while the latter suits those driven by Sales-led Growth (SLG). Both must prioritize data. If product-driven, each feature should contribute to data accumulation. If operation-driven, operations should focus on data, not just revenue or other metrics.

Returning to Perplexity’s case, Jiayang Qing could replicate Perplexity’s main functions over a weekend but not its data accumulation. As a middleware company, Lepton likely doesn’t intend this as a core strategy. However, many new application startups may use this to challenge Perplexity further. Whether Perplexity can withstand this depends on its ability to build a moat with proprietary data.

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A Personal Story about LLMs and Storytell.ai

My name is Jing Conan Wang, a co-founder and CTO of Storytell.ai. In October 2022, together with two amazing partners DROdio and Erika, we founded Storytell.ai, dedicated to distilling signal from noise to improve the efficiency of knowledge workers. The reason we chose the name Storytell.ai is that storytelling is the oldest tool for knowledge distillation in human history. In ancient times, people sat around bright campfires telling stories, allowing human experiences and wisdom to be passed down through generations.

The past year has been an explosive one for large language models (LLMs). With the meteoric rise of ChatGPT, LLMs have quickly become known to the general public. I hope to share my own personal story to give people a glimpse into the grandeur of entrepreneurship in the field of large language models.

From Google and Beyond

Although ChatGPT comes from OpenAI, the roots of LLMs lie in Google Brain – a deep learning lab founded by Jeff Dean, Andrew Ng, and others. It was during my time at Google Brain that I formed a connection with LLMs. I worked at Google for five years, spending the first three in Ads engineering and the latter two in Google Brain. Not long after joining Google Brain, I noticed that one colleague after another began shifting their focus to research on large language models. That period (2017-2019) was the germination phase for LLMs, with a plethora of new technologies emerging in Google’s labs. Being in the midst of this environment allowed me to gain a profound understanding of the capabilities of LLMs. Particularly, there were a few experiences that made me realize that a true technological revolution in language models was on the horizon:

One was about BERT — one of the best LLMs before ChatGPT: One day in 2017, while I was in a Google Cafe, a thunderous applause broke out. It turned out that a group nearby was discussing the results of an experiment. Google provides free lunches for its employees, and lunchtime often brings people together to talk about work. A colleague mentioned to me: “Do you know about BERT?” At the time, I only knew BERT as a character from the American animated show Sesame Street, which I had never watched. My colleague told me: “BERT has increased Google Search revenue by 1% in internal experiments.” Google’s revenue was already over a hundred billion dollars a year, meaning this was equivalent to several billion dollars in annual revenue. This was quite shocking to me.

Another was my experience with Duplex: Sunder Pichai released a demo of an AI making phone calls at Google I/O 2018, which caused a sensation in the industry. The project, internally known as Duplex, was something our group was responsible for in terms of related model work. The demo only showed a small part of what was possible; internally, there was a lot more data on similar AI phone calls. We often needed to review the results of the Duplex model. The outcome was astonishing; I could hardly differentiate between conversations held by AI or humans.

Another gain was my reflection on business models. Although I had worked in Google’s commercialization team for a long time and the models I personally worked on generated over two hundred million dollars in annual revenue for Google, I realized that an advertising-driven business model would become a shackle for large language models. The biggest problem with the advertising business model is that it treats users’ attention (time) as a commodity for sale. To users, it seems like they are using the product for free, but in reality, they are giving their attention to the platform. The platform has no incentive to increase user efficiency but rather to capture more attention to sell at a very low price. Valuable users will eventually leave the platform, leading to the platform itself becoming increasingly worthless.

One of the AI applications I worked on at Google Brain was the video recommendation on YouTube’s homepage. The entire business model of Google and YouTube is based on advertising; longer user watch time means more ad revenue. Therefore, for applications like YouTube, the most important goal is to increase the total time users spend on the app. At that time, TikTok had not yet risen, and YouTube was unrivaled in the video domain in the United States. In YouTube’s model review meetings, we often joked that the only way for us to get more usage is to reduce the time people spend eating and sleeping. Although I wanted to improve user experience through better algorithms, no matter how I adjusted, the ultimate goal was still inseparable from increasing user watch time to boost ad revenue.

During my contemplation, I gradually encountered the Software as a Service (SaaS) business model and felt that this was the right model for large-scale models. In SaaS, users only pay for subscriptions if they receive continuous value. SaaS is customer-driven, whereas Google’s culture overly emphasizes an engineering culture and neglects customer value, making it very difficult to explore this path within Google. Ultimately, I was determined to leave Google and decided to start my own SaaS company. At the end of 2019, I joined a SaaS startup as a Founding Member and learned about the building process of a SaaS company from zero to one. 

At the same time, I was also looking for good partners. Finally, in 2021 I was able to meet two amazing partners DROdio and Erika and we started storytell.ai in 2022.

Build a company of belonging

The first thing we did at the inception of our company was to clarify our vision and culture. We want to build a company of belonging by defining our vision and culture clearly. The vision and culture of a company truly define its DNA; the vision helps us know where to go, and the culture ensures we work together effectively. 

Storytell’s vision is to become the Clarity Layer, using AI to help people distill signal from noise (https://go.storytell.ai/vision).  — a company with great vision and culture.

We have six cultural values: 1) Apply High-Leverage Thinking. 2) Everyone is Crew. 3) Market Signal is our North Star. 4) We Default to Transparency. 5) We Prioritize Courageous Candor in our Interactions. 6) We are a Learning Organization. Please refer to this https://go.Storytell.ai/values for details. 

We also pay special attention to team culture building during the company’s creation process. From the start, we hope to work hard but also play harder. We have offsite gatherings every quarter. The entire team is very fond of outdoor activities and camping, so we often hold various outdoor events (we have a shared album with photos from the very first day of our establishment). We call ourselves the Storytell Crew, hoping that we can traverse the stars and oceans together like an astronaut crew.

Build a Product that people love

In the early stages of a startup, finding Product-Market Fit (PMF) is of utmost importance. Traditional SaaS software emphasizes specialization and segmentation, with typically only a few companies iterating within each niche, and product stability may take years to achieve. This year, ChatGPT brought about a radical market change. The explosive popularity of ChatGPT is a double-edged sword for SaaS software entrepreneurs. On one hand, it reduces the cost of educating the market; on the other hand, the entire field becomes more competitive, with a surge of entrepreneurs entering the market and diverting customer resources. The influx of ineffective traffic brought by ChatGPT ultimately fails to convert effectively into the product.

Many believe that the moat for startups applying large models is technology or data. We think neither is the case. The real moat is the skill in wielding this double-edged sword. Good swordsmanship can transform both edges of the sword into a force that breaks through barriers:

  1. On one hand, for traditional SaaS, it’s about leveraging the momentum of ChatGPT to maximize the impact on traditional SaaS. Make customers feel the urgency to keep up with the times. Develop AI Native features that incumbents find hard to follow.
  2. On the other hand, use the competition to bring about a thriving ecosystem and have a methodical and steadfast approach in product iteration, ultimately shortening the product iteration cycle to achieve the greatest momentum.

We follow these two principles in our own product iteration.

1) Data-guided: In the iteration process, we use the North Star Metric to guide our general direction. Our North Star Metric is:

Effective Reach = Total Reach   x   Effective Ratio

Total reach is the number of summaries and questions asked on our platform each day. The Effective Ratio is a number from 0 to 1 that indicates how much of the content we generate is useful for users.

2) User-driven. Drive product feature adjustments through in-depth communication with users. For collecting user feedback, we’ve adopted a combination of online and offline methods. Online, we use user behavior analysis tools to identify meaningful user actions and follow up with user interviews to collect specific feedback. Offline, we organize many events to bring users together for brainstorming sessions.

With this approach in mind, our product has undergone multiple rounds of iteration in the past year.

V0: Slack Plugin

Since June 2022, Erika, DROdio and I have been conducting numerous customer discovery calls. During our interviews with users, we often needed to record the conversations. We primarily used Zoom, but Zoom itself did not provide a summarization tool back then. I used the GPT-3 API to create a Slack plugin that automatically generates summaries. Whenever we had a Zoom meeting, it would automatically send the meeting video link to a specific Slack channel. Subsequently, our plugin would reply with an auto-generated summary. Users could also ask some follow-up questions in response.

At that time, there weren’t many tools available for automatically generating summaries, and every user we interviewed was amazed by this tool. This made us gradually shift our focus towards the direction of automatic summarization. The Slack plugin allowed us to collect a lot of user feedback. By the end of December 2022, we realized the limitations of the Slack plugin. 

  1. Firstly: Slack is a system with high friction. Only system administrators can install plugins; regular employees cannot install plugins themselves. 
  2. We had almost no usage of our Slack plugin over the weekends. The likelihood of users using Slack in their personal workflows was low.
  3. Slack’s own interface caused a great deal of confusion for our users.

V1: Chrome Extension

We began developing a Chrome extension in December 2022, primarily to address the issues mentioned above. While Chrome extensions also have friction, users have the option to install them individually. Chrome extensions can also automatically summarize pages that users have visited, achieving the effect of AI as a companion. Additionally, Chrome extensions facilitate better synergy between personal and work use. During the iteration process of the Chrome extension, we realized that chat is one of the most important means of interaction. Users can accurately express their needs by asking questions (or using prompt words). Although we allowed users to ask questions during the Slack phase, the main focus was still on providing a series of buttons. In the iteration process of the Chrome extension, we discovered that the chat interface is very flexible and can quickly uncover customer needs that weren’t predefined.

On January 17th, we released our Chrome extension. However, on February 7th, Microsoft released Bing Chat (later known as Copilot), integrated into Microsoft Edge. By March, the Chrome Store was flooded with Copilot copycats. We quickly realized that the direction Copilot was taking would soon become a saturated market. Additionally, during the development of our Chrome extension, we became aware of some bottlenecks. The friction in developing Chrome extensions is quite high. Google’s Web Store review process takes about a week. This wouldn’t be a problem in traditional software development, but it’s very disadvantageous for the development of large models. This year, the iteration speed of large models is essentially daily. If we update only once a week, it’s easy to fall behind.

V2: VirtualMe™ (Digital Twin)

In March 2023, we began developing our own web-based application. Users can upload their documents or audio and video files, and then we generate summaries, allowing users to ask corresponding questions. Our initial intention was to build a user interaction platform that we could control. The development speed of the web-based application was an order of magnitude faster than the Chrome extension. We could release updates four to five times a day without waiting for Google’s approval. Moreover, with the Chrome extension, we could only use a small part of the browser’s right side. There were many limitations in interaction, but with the web-based platform, we have complete control over user interactions, allowing us to create more complex user-product interactions.

During this process, we learned that it is very difficult to retain users with utility applications. Users typically leave as soon as they are done with the tool, showing no loyalty. Costs remain high. Moreover, with a large number of AI utility tools going global, the field is becoming increasingly crowded.

We began deliberately filtering our users to interview enterprise users and understand their feedback. By June 2023, we realized that the best way to increase user stickiness was to integrate tightly with enterprise workflows. Enterprise workflows naturally result in data accumulation, and becoming part of an enterprise’s workflow enhances the product’s moat.

We started thinking about how our product could integrate with enterprise workflows. We came up with the idea of creating a personified agent. Most of the time when we encounter problems at work, we first ask our colleagues. A personified agent could integrate well with this workflow. We quickly developed a prototype and invited some users for beta testing.

Our initial user scenario envisioned that everyone could create their own digital twin. Users could upload their data to their digital twin so that when they are not online, it could answer questions on their behalf. After launching the product, we found that the most common use case was not creating one’s own digital twin, but creating the digital twin of someone else. For instance, we found that product managers were heavy users of our product. They mainly created digital twins of their customers to ask questions and see how the customers would respond.

During the VirtualMe™ phase, we began to refine our enterprise user persona for the first time. We identified several user personas, mainly 1. Product Managers, 2. Marketing Managers, 3. Customer Success Managers. Their common characteristic is the need to better understand others and create accordingly.

At the end of July, we organized an offline event and invited many users to test our VirtualMe product together. They found our product very useful, but they had significant concerns about the personified agent. Personal branding is very important for our user group. They were worried that what the virtual twin says could impact their personal brand, especially since large models generally still have the potential for “hallucination.”

It was also at this event that users mentioned the part of our product they found most useful was the customizable Data Container and the ability to quickly generate a chatbot. At that time, no other product on the market could do this.

V3: SmartChat™

Starting in August, we began to emphasize data management features based on this approach and launched SmartChat™. In SmartChat™, once users upload data, we automatically extract tags from the content. Users can also customize tags for data management. By clicking on a tag, the ChatBot will converse based on the content associated with that tag. At the same time, we also launched an automation system that runs prompts for users automatically, pushing the results to the appropriate audience via Slack or email.

The following figure shows our North Star Metric (NSM) up to December 1st of this year. At the beginning of the year, during the Slack plugin phase, our NSM was only averaging around 1. During the Chrome Extension phase, our NSM reached the hundreds. VirtualMe™ pushed our NSM up to 5,000.

By early December, our NSM was close to 20,000. Previously, our growth was entirely organic. By this time, we felt we could start to do a bit of growth hacking. In December, we started some influencer marketing activities, and our NSM grew by 30 times, reaching 550K!

From an NSM of less than 1 at the beginning of the year to 550K by the end of the year, in 2023 we turned Storytell from a demo into a product with a loyal user base. I am proud of our Crew and very grateful to our early users and design partners.

Words at the end

From a young age, I have been particularly fond of reading books on the history of entrepreneurship. The year 2023 marks the beginning of a new era for me to embark this journey. I know the road ahead is challenging, but I am fortunate to experience this process firsthand with my two amazing partners and our Crew. Regardless of the outcome, I will forge ahead with all the Storytell Crew, fearless and without regret. Looking forward to Storytell riding the waves in 2024!


Also, Storytell.ai is hiring front-end and full-stack engineers: https://go.storytell.ai/fse-role. If you are interested or you know anyone might be interested, please don’t hesitate to contact me at my email jingconan@storytell.ai.

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一位LLM创业者的故事

我叫王晶,Storytell.ai的联合创始人和CTO。2022年10月我和两位合伙人共同创立了Storytell.ai,致力于用大语言模型(LLM)蒸馏知识,帮助知识工作者提能增效。我们之所以取名为Storytell,正是在于故事是人类历史上最古老的知识蒸馏工具。在远古时代,人们围坐在明亮的篝火旁讲故事,使得人类的经验和智慧得以口口相传。

过去的一年是大语言模型爆发的一年。随着ChatGPT的爆红,大语言模型迅速为普罗大众所知。我希望通过分享我自己的故事,帮助大家管中窥豹,了解大语言模型创业的波澜壮阔。

出走谷歌

九层之台,起于累土。虽然ChatGPT来自于OpenAI,但是大语言模型的发源地是在在谷歌大脑 (Google Brain) — 这是一个由Jeff Dean,吴恩达等人创立的深度学习的实验室 。我和大语言模型结缘正是我在谷歌大脑工作的期间。 我在谷歌工作五年,前三年在广告商业化部门,后两年则是转到谷歌大脑。我进入谷歌大脑不久,就发现周围的同事一个接一个转移到大语言模型方面的研究,那段时间(2017-2019年)正是大语言模型的萌发期,大量的新技术在谷歌实验室里出现。身处其中,使得我对于大模型的能力有了深刻的理解。尤其是几个经历让我意识到语言模型即将出现真正的技术革命:

  1. 一个是关于BERT的小经历:2017年有一天我去食堂食堂吃饭,突然之间食堂里面传来了雷鸣般的掌声。原来是附近有一个组在讨论实验的结果。谷歌为员工提供免费的午饭。午饭时间大家经常会聚在一起聊工作的事情。我周围的同事和我说:你知道BERT么?我当时只知道BERT是美国动画芝麻街(Sesame Street)里面的,但是我也没有看过这个动画。同事和我说:BERT在内部实验中将谷歌搜索的营收增加了了1%。当时谷歌的营收已经每年一千多亿美金,这个意味着每年数十亿美金的营收。这对我是相当震撼的。
  2. 一个是关于Duplex的经历:Sunder Pichai在2018年Google IO发布了一个人工智能打电话的demo。引起了业界的震撼。这个项目内部叫做Duplex,当时我们组在负责Duplex相关的模型工作。Demo展示的只是其中的一个小片段,内部还有很多类似的AI电话的数据。我们经常需要review duplex模型的结果。结果令我震惊,我基本上无法分辨AI或者人的对话。

另一个收获是关于商业模式的思考。虽然我在谷歌商业化团队做过很久,我个人做的模型也为谷歌每年带来超过两亿美元的营收,但是我意识到广告为主的商业模式将成为大语言模型的桎梏。广告的商业模式最大的问题就是将用户的注意力(时间 )作为一个待售的商品。对于用户来说,看起来是免费使用了产品,但是实际上是将自己的注意力赠予了平台。而平台没有动机去增加用户效率,而是获取更多的注意力,以极低的价格出售。有价值的用户最终会离开平台,导致平台本身愈发不值钱。

我在谷歌大脑做的其中一个AI落地业务就是YouTube首页的视频流推荐。整个Google和YouTube的商业模式就是广告,更长的用户时长就意味着更多的广告搜入。 所以YouTube这类应用最重要的是增加在App上的总使用时长。当时TikTok还没有起来,YouTube在美国的视频领域一骑绝尘。在YouTube的模型评审会上,我们经常要讨论的如何减少人的吃饭睡觉的时间。 虽然我当时希望通过改进算法来改善用户体验。但是无论怎么调整,最终的目标还是脱离不了增加用户使用时间,以期增加广告营收。

在我思考的过程中,我逐渐接触到Software as a Service (SaaS)的商业模式,觉得这才是大模型的正确商业模式。在SaaS里面,只有切实的为用户提供持续的价值,用户才会付费订阅。SaaS讲究的是客户驱动,而谷歌的文化过分强调工程师文化,忽略了客户价值。这使得在谷歌内部探索这个道路非常困难。最终我坚定了离开谷歌,决定做一个自己SaaS的创业公司。我在2019年底加入了一家SaaS初创公司成为Founding Member,了解了SaaS公司从0到1的构建过程。在这个过程中也同时寻找合适的商业合伙人。终于在2022年我和两个合伙人创立了Storytell.ai。

产品迭代

创业初期最重要的是寻找产品市场契合(PMF)。传统SaaS软件讲究专业化细分化,基本上每一个赛道只有少数的公司在进行迭代,产品稳定可能需要数年的时间。今年ChatGPT带来了的市场天翻地覆的变化。ChatGPT爆红对于SaaS软件创业者来说是一把双刃剑。一方面降低了教育市场的成本,另一方面整个赛道变得更卷,大量的创业者涌入分流了客户资源,ChatGPT带来的很多无效流量,最终不能有效内化为产品。

很多人认为大模型应用创业的护城河是技术,或者是数据。我们认为这些都不是。真正的护城河是用好这把双刃剑的剑术。好的剑术能将剑的双刃都转化为破局之力:

  • 一方面对于传统SaaS,利用ChatGPT势能,最大化对于传统SaaS的冲击。让客户感受到跟上大时代的紧迫性。做AI Native的feature,使得incumbent难以跟进。
  • 另一方面利用竞争带来的生态繁荣,并且在产品迭代上有章法,有定力,最终缩短产品迭代周期,实现最大动能。

在产品迭代上,我们遵循这两个原则:

1)数据指引: 在迭代的过程中,我们通过北极星指标来指引我们的大致方向。我们的北极星指标(North Star Metric)是:

每日使用量 X 信噪比

每日使用量是我们平台每天的摘要和用户询问问题的数量。信噪比是一个0到1的数字,表示有多少我们生成的内容获得了用户的正反馈。

2)用户驱动。利用用户的深度交流驱动产品功能调整。我们还形成了一个传统,我们每个季度

在收集用户反馈上,我们采取了线上线下结合的方式。线上通过用户行为分析用具确定有意思的用户行为,跟进进行用户访谈收集具体反馈。线下采取了组织很多的活动将用户聚拢到一起,进行头脑风暴。

在这样的思路下,我们的产品进行了多轮的迭代。

V0: Slack插件

2022年6月份开始我们就开始进行了很多的用户访谈(Customer Discovery Call)。我们在和用户访谈的过程中经常需要把客户的访谈录下来。我们主要用的是Zoom,但是Zoom自己不提供摘要的工具。我利用GPT3的API做了一个自动生成摘要的Slack的插件,每当我们有Zoom会议时。就会自动给一个特定的Slack Channel发送会议的视频链接。之后我们的插件会回复一个自动生成的摘要。用户也可以回复一些followup的问题。

当时市面上没有什么自动生成摘要的工具,每一个和我们访谈的用户都对这个工具非常的惊叹。这个使得我们逐渐开始把注意力都放在这个自动摘要的方向上。Slack插件让我们收集到了很多的用户反馈。到了2022年12月底,我们意识到了Slack插件的局限性。

  1. 首先:Slack是一个friction非常高的系统。只有系统管理员可以安装插件,普通员工是无法自己安装插件的。
  2. 我们Slack的周末几乎没有使用量。用户在个人工作流中使用Slack的可能性很低。
  3. Slack本身的界面给我们的用户带来了很大的混淆。

V1: Chrome Extension

我们在2022年12月份开始开发Chrome插件。我们考虑这个主要解决上面这些问题。Chrome插件虽然也有Friction,但是用户可以选择个人安装。Chrome插件也可以自动summarize用户访问过的页面(实现AI as a companion的效果)。另外Chrome 插件比较容易形成个人和工作的协同。在Chrome Extension的迭代过程中,我们意识到Chat是一种最为重要的交互手段。用户通过提问(或者提示词prompt)可以将准确的表达他们的需求。我们虽然在Slack阶段也允许用户提问,但是主要的重心还是放在提供一系列的按钮。在Chrome Extension的迭代过程中,我们发现了聊天的的界面具有很大的灵活性,并且可以快速的发现没有预先定义好的客户需求。

1月17号我们发布了我们的Chrome 插件。但是2月7号微软发布了Bing Chat(后来的Copilot),集成到了Microsoft Edge里面。到了三月份间,Chrome商店大量出现了Copilot的Copy Cat。我们很快意识到Copilot方向将很快成为红海。另外我们在Chrome插件开发的过程中也意识到一些瓶颈。Chrome插件开发的Friction是很高的。Google的Web Store的审核需要一个星期左右的时间。这在传统软件开发里面是没有问题的。但是对于大模型的开发是非常不利的。今年大模型本身的迭代速度基本上是日更。如果每周更新一次,很容易会落后。

V2: VirtualMe™ (数字分身)

在2023年3月份我们开始开发自己的网页端应用。用户可以上传自己的文档或者音频视频,然后我们会生成摘要,并且用户询问相应的问题。我们开发的初衷是就是构建自己可控的用户交互的平台。网页端的开发速度比Chrome Extension高出了一个数量级。我们可以做到每天四五次发布。不再需要等待Google的批准。而且Chrome插件基本上我们只有浏览器右边的一小部分可以使用。在交互上面还有很多的限制,网页端我们对于用户交互具有完全的控制力,使得我们可以做更加复杂的用户产品交互。

在这个过程中我们学到工具类应用是非常难以做用户存留。用户基本上用完即走,没有忠诚度。成本居高不下。而且随着大量的AI工具类出海应用,这个赛道逐渐变得拥挤。

 我们开始从我们的用户中刻意筛选企业用户进行访谈,了解他们的反馈。到了2023年6月份间,我们意识到,增加用户粘性的最好方式是企业工作流进行紧密的结合。企业工作流本身会自然出现数据的沉淀,并且成为企业工作流程的一部分是增强了产品的护城河。

我们开始思考我们产品和企业工作流的结合。我们想到做拟人化的代理Agent。绝大多数时候我们在工作中碰到问题,其实是首先去问同事。拟人化的Agent可以很好的和这个工作流程结合。我们很快开发出了原型,并且邀请了一些用户内测。

我们起初设想的用户场景是每一个人可以创建自己的数字分身。用户可以上传自己的数据到自己的数字分身。这样当用户不在线的时候,可以替代他回答同事的问题。当我们推出产品之后,我们发现最常用的使用场景不是创建自己的数字分身,而是创建别人的分身。比如说我们这个过程中发现产品经理对我们的使用量很大。他们主要是创建自己客户的数字分身,然后询问,看看客户会怎么回答。

在VirtualMe™阶段,是我们第一次开始细化企业端的用户画像。我们identify了几个用户画像。主要是1.产品经理。2营销经理。3客户成功经理。他们的特点都是需要更好的了解其他,并且创建相应

我们七月底的时候组织了一个线下活动,邀请了很多用户过来一起测试我们的VirtualMe产品。他们对我们的产品反馈是非常好用,但是他们对于你拟人化的Agent有很大的顾虑。对于我们的用户群来说,个人品牌是很重要的。他们担心虚拟分身所说的话会对自己的个人品牌有影响。尤其是大模型普遍还是存在“幻觉”(Hallucination)的可能性。

也是在这个活动中,用户提到他们对于我们产品觉得最好用的部分就是子自定义Data Container,并且可以快速的生成一个ChatBot 。这个在当时市面上尚无任何其他产品可以做到。

V3: SmartChat™ 

八月份开始,我们依据这个思路深入挖掘数据管理功能。推出了SmartChat™.  在SmartChat™里面用户上传数据之后,我们会自动提取内容中的标签。并且用户也可以自定义标签,进行数据管理。用户可以点击标签,ChatBot就会依据标签里面的内容进行对话。同时我们也上线了自动化系统,自动化的帮用户run prompt,将结果通过Slack或者邮件推送给合适的受众。

下图是我们到今年12月1日的北极星指标。在年初Slack插件阶段,我们的NSM(北极星指标)只有平均不到1左右。在Chrome Extension阶段,我们的NSM达到了数百。VirtualMe™将我们的NSM推高到5000。

到了12月初,我们的NSM接近两万。之前我们全部都是靠自然增长。到了这个时期我们觉得可以稍微开始做一些增长。12月份的时候我们开始了一些Influence marketing的活动,我们在12月NSM增长了30倍,达到了550K!

从年初不到1的NSM到年末550K。2023年我们把Storytell从一个demo,做到了有忠实用户基础的产品。我为我们的团队感到自豪,也非常感激我们的早期用户和设计伙伴(Design Partners)。

构建企业愿景和文化

我们在创立之初第一件事情就是厘清公司的愿景和文化。企业的愿景和文化真正定义了一个企业的基因,愿景是帮助我们知道该向何处去,文化保证我们有效的合作。Storytell的愿景是希望能够成为(Clarity Layer),利用AI来帮助人从纷繁的信息里面抽丝剥茧(https://go.storytell.ai/vision)。我们有了六个企业文化价值:1)杠杆思维 Apply High-Leverage Thinking。2)同舟共济 Everyone is Crew。 3)市场驱动 Market Signal is our North Star。 4)默认透明。We Default to Transparency。 5)坦诚沟通 We Prioritize Courageous Candor in our Interactions。 感兴趣的朋友可以看这里 https://go.Storytell.ai/values。我们在公司创建的过程中也特别注重团队文化建设。我们从开始希望的是work hard but also play harder。每一个季度我们都会有offsite。整个团队都非常喜欢户外和Camping,所以我们经常举行各种户外活动(我们有一个共享相册,有我们成立第一天开始的照片)。我们称自己为Storytell Crew。就是希望我们能够向一个宇航员机组一样,一起跨越星辰大海。

结语

从小我尤其喜欢读创业史的书籍,吴晓波的《激荡三十年》,和林军的《沸腾十五年》都让我心潮澎湃而心向往之。初闻不知曲中意,再闻已是曲中人。2023年已是一个新时代的开端。我知前路维艰,但有幸亲身经历这个过程。无论结果如何,我都会和所有的Storytell Crew一起砥砺前行。无惧无悔。期待2024 Storytell能够乘风破浪!

另外也打一个小广告,Storytell.ai正在招聘前端和全栈工程师:https://go.storytell.ai/fse-role 如果有兴趣的朋友可以联系我,我的邮箱是 jingconan@storytell.ai